------------------------------------------ -- EZ A SZÁM CSAK TEXT FORMÁBAN LÉTEZIK -- ------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 8 Mar 91 22:48:21 EST Subject: *** FORUM *** #166 Tartalomjegyzek: ---------------- Felado : pvoros@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Temakor : Competitive Advantage of Nations Felado : elekgab@descartes.math.purdue.edu Temakor : ??? Felado : ok1kk@gemini.ldc.lu.se Temakor : Amerika messze van === Felado : hetyei@athena.mit.edu Temakor : Re: Amerika messze van =============================================== Felado : pvoros@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Beerkezett: Fri Mar 8 06:20:31 EST 1991 Temakor : Competitive Advantage of Nations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kedves Forumozok! Eloszor is koszonet a batorito levelekert; nagy levegovetelt kerek, mert jon a (valoszinuleg leghosszabb resz:) folytatas, ebben vezeti be a a szerzo az altaltala hasznalt legfontosabb fogalmakat - ezert nem akartam szetvagni, ami most jon. Kellemes fejtorest es szorakozast: ***************************************************************************** The Competitive Advantage of Nations by Michael E. Porter National prosperity is created, not inherited. It does not grow out of a country's natural endowments, its labor pool, its interest rates, or its currency's value, as classical economics insists. A nation's competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade. Companies gain advantage against the world's best competitors because of pressure and challenge. They benefit from having strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local customers. In a world of increasingly global competition, nations have become more, not less, important. As the basis of competition has shifted more and more to the creation and assimilation of knowledge, the role of the nation has grown. Competitive advantage is created and sustained through a highly localized process. Differences in national values, culture, economic structures, institution, and histories all contribute to competitive success. There are striking differences in the pattern of competitiveness in every country, no nation can or will be competitive in every or even most industries. Ultimately, nations succeed in particular industries because their home environment is the most forward-looking, dynamic, and challenging. These conclusion, the product of a four-year study of the patterns of competitive success in ten leading trading nations, contradict the conventional wisdom that guides the thinking of many companies and national governments - and that is pervasive today in the United States. According to prevailing thinking, labor costs, interest rates, exchange rates, and economies of scale are the most potent determinants of competitiveness. In companies, the words of the day are merger, alliance, strategic partnerships, collaboration, and supranational globalization. Managers are pressing for more government support for particular industries. Among governments, there is a growing tendency to experiment with various policies intended to promote national competitiveness - from efforts to manage exchange rates to new measures to manage trade to policies to relax antitrust - which usually end up only undermining it. These approaches, now much in favor in both companies and governments, are flawed. They fundamentally misperceive the true sources of competitive advantage. Pursuing them, with all their short-term appeal, will virtually guarantee that the United States - or any other advanced nation - never achieves real and sustainable competitive advantage. We need a new perspective and new tools - an approach to competitiveness that grows directly out of an analysis of internationally successful industries, without regard for traditional ideology or current intellectual fashion. We need to know, very simply, what works and why. Then we need to apply it. How Companies Succeed in International Markets Around the world, companies that have achieved international leadership employ strategies that differ from each other in every respect. But while every successful company will employ its own particular strategy, the underlying mode of operation - the character and trajectory of all successful companies - is fundamentally the same. Companies achieve competitive advantage through acts of innovation. They approach innovation in its broadest sense, including both new technologies and new ways of doing things. They perceive a new basis for competing or find better means for competing in old ways. Innovation can be manifested in a new product design, a new production process, a new marketing approach, or a new way of conducting training. Much innovation is mundane and incremental, depending more on a cumulation of small insights and advances than on a single, major technological breakthrough. It often involves ideas that are not even "new" - ideas that have been around, but never vigorously pursued. It always involves investments in skill and knowledge, as well as in physical assets and brand reputations. Some innovations create competitive advantage by perceiving an entirely new market opportunity or by serving a market segment that others have ignored. When competitors are slow to respond, such innovation yields competitive advantage. For instance, in industries such as autos and home electronics, Japanese companies gained their initial advantage byemphasizing smaller, more compact, lower capacity models that foreign competitors disdained as less profitable, less important, and less attractive. In international markets, innovations that yield competitive advantage anticipate both domestic and foreign needs. For example, as international concern for product safety has grown, Swedish companies like Volvo, Atlas Copco, and AGA have succeeded by anticipating the market opportunity in this area. On the other hand, innovations that respond to concerns or circumstances that are peculiar to the home market can actually retard international competitive success. The lure of the huge U.S. defense market, for instance, has diverted the of U.S. materials and machine-tool companies from attractive, global commercial markets. Information plays a large role in the process of innovation and improvement - information that either is not available to competitors or that they do not seek. Sometimes it comes from simple investment in reseach and development or market research; more often it comes from effort and from openness and from looking in the right place unencumbered by blinding assumptions or conventional wisdom. This is why innovators are often outsiders from a different industry or a different country. Innovation may come from a new company, whose founder has a nontraditional background or was simply not appreciated in an older, established company. Or the capacity for innovation may come into an existing company through senior managers who are new to the particular industry and thus more able to perceive opportunities and more likely to pursue them. Or o.n. may occur as a company diversifies, bringing new resources, skill, or perspectives to another industry. Or innovations may come from another nation with different circumstances or different way of competing. With few exceptions, innovation is the result of unusual effort. The company that successfully implements a new or better way of competing pursues its approach with dogged determination, often in the face of harsh criticism and tough obstacles. In fact, to succeed, innovation usually requires pressure, necessity, and even adversity; the fear of loss often proves more powerful than the hope of gain. Once a company achieves competitive advantage through innovation, it can sustain it only through relentless improvement. Almost any advantage can be imitated. Korean companies have already matched the ability of their Japanese rivals to mass-produce standard color televisions and VCRs; Brazilian companies have assembled technology and designs comparable to Italian competitors in casual leather footwear. Competitors will eventually and inevitably overtake any company that stops improving and innovating. Sometimes early-mover advantages such as customer relationships, scale economies in existing technologies, or the loyalty of distribution channels are enough to permit a stagnant company to retain its entrenched position for years or even decades. But sooner or later, more dynamic rivals find a way to innovate around these advantages or create a better or cheaper way of doing things. Italian appliance producers, which competed successfully on the basis of cost in selling midsize and compact appliances through large retail chains, rested too long on this initial advantage. By developing more differentiated products and creating strong brand franchises, German competitors have begun to gain ground. Ultimately, the only way to sustain a competitive advantage is to upgrade it - to move to more sophisticated types. This is precisely what Japanese automakers have done. They initially penetrated foreign market with small, inexpensive compact cars of adequate quality and competed on the basis of lower labor costs. Even while their labor-cost advantage persisted, however, the Japanese companies were upgrading. They invested aggressively to build large modern plants to reap economies of scale. Then they became innovators in process technology, pioneering just-in-time production and a host of other quality and productivity practices. These process improvement led to better product quality, better repair records, and better customer-satisfaction ratings than foreign competitors had. Most recently, Japanese automakers have advanced to the vanguard of product technology and are introducing new, premium brand names to compete with the world's most prestigious passenger cars. The example of the Japanese automakers also illustrates two additional prerequisites for sustaining competitive advantage. First, a company must adopt a global approach to strategy. It must sell its product worldwide, under its own brand name, through international marketing channels that it controls. A truly global approach may even require the company to locate production or reseach and development facilities in other nation to take advantage of lower wage rates, to gain or improve market access, or to take advantage of foreign technology. Second, creating more sustainable advantages often means that a company must make its existing advantage obsolete - even while it is still an advantage. Japanese auto companies recognized this; either they would make their advantage obsolete, or a competitor would do it for them. As this example suggest, innovation and change are inextricably tied together. But change is an unnatural act, particularly in successful companies; powerful forces are at work to avoid and defeat it. Past approaches become institutionalized in standard operating procedures and management controls. Training emphasizes the one correct way to do anything, the construction of specialized, dedicated facilities solidifies past practice into expensive brick and mortar; the existing strategy takes on an aura of invincibility and becomes rooted in the company culture. Successful companies tend to develop a bias for predictability and stability; they work on defending what they have. Change is tempered by the fear the there is much to lose. The organization at all levels filters out information that would suggest new approaches, modifications, or departures from the norm. The internal environment operates like an immune system to isolate or expel "hostile" individuals who challenge current directions or established thinking. Innovation ceases; the company becomes stagnant; it is only a matter of time before aggressive competitors overtake it. The Diamond of National Advantage Why are certain companies based in certain nations capable of consistent innovation? Why do they ruthlessly pursue improvements, seeking an evermore sophisticated source of competitive advantage? Why are they able to overcome the substantial barriers to change and innovation that so often accompany success? The answer lies in four broad attributes of a nation, attributes that individually and as a system constitute the diamond of national advantage, the playing field that each nation establishes and operates for its industries. The attributes are: 1. Factor Conditions. The nation's position in factors of production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry. 2. Demand Conditions. The nature of home-market demand for the industry's product or service. 3. Related and Supporting Industries. The presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries and other related industries that are internationally competitive. 4. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how companies are created, organized, and managed, as well as the nature of domestic rivalry. These determinants create the national environment in which companies are born and learn how to compete. Diagram: DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ Factor Conditions <---------------------------> Demand Conditions \ | / \ | / \ | / \ | / \ | / Related and Supporting Industries Each point on the diamond - and the diamond as a system -affects essential ingredients for achieving international competitive success: the availability of resources and skill necessary for competitive advantage in an industry; the information that shapes the opportunities that companies perceive and the directions in which they deploy their resources and skills; the goals of the owners, managers, and individuals in companies; and most important, the pressures on companies to invest and innovate. When a national environment permits and supports the most rapid accumulation of specialized asses and skills - sometimes simply because of greater effort and commitment - companies gain a competitive advantage. When a national environment affords better ongoing information and insight into product and process needs, companies gain a competitive advantage. Finally, when the national environment pressures companies to innovate and invest, companies both gain a competitive advantage and upgrade those advantages over time. Factor Conditions According to standard economic theory, factor production - labor, land, natural resources, capital, infrastructure - will determine the flow of trade. A nation will export those goods that make most use of the factors with which it is relatively well endowed. This doctrine, whose origins date back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and that is embedded in classical economics, is at best incomplete and at worst incorrect. In the sophisticated industries that form the backbone of any advanced economy, a nation does not inherit but instead creates the most important factor of production - such as skilled human resources or a scientific base. Moreover, the stock of factors that a nation enjoys at a particular time is less important than the rate and efficiency with which it creates, upgrades, and deploys them in particular industries. The most important factors of production are those that involve sustained and heavy investment an are specialized. Basic factors, such as a pool of labor or a local raw-material source, do not constitute an advantage in knowledge-intensive industries. Companies can access them easily through a global strategy or circumvent them through technology. Contrary to conventional wisdom, simply having a general work force that is high school or even college educated represents no competitive advantage in modern international competition. To support competitive advantage, a factor must be highly specialized to an industry' particular needs - a scientific institute specialized in optics, a pool of venture capital to fund software companies. These factors are more scarce, more difficult for foreign competitors to imitate - and they require sustained innovation to create. Nations succeed in industries where they are particularly good at factor creation. Competitive advantage result from the presence of world-class institution that first create specialized factors and then continually work to upgrade them. Denmark has two hospital that concentrate in studying and treating diabetes - and a world-leading export position in insulin. Holland has premier research institutes in the cultivation, packaging, and shipping of flowers, where it is the world's export leader. What is not so obvious, however, is that selective disadvantages in the more basic factors can prod a company to innovate and upgrade - a disadvantage a static model of competition can become an advantage in a dynamic one. When there is an amply supply of cheap raw materials or abundant labor, companies can simply rest on these advantages and often deploy them inefficiently. But when companies face a selective disadvantage, like high land costs, labor shortages, or the lack of local raw material, they must innovate and upgrade to compete. Implicit in the oft-repeated Japanese statement, "We are an island nation with no natural resources", is the understanding that these deficiencies have only served to spur Japan's competitive innovation. Just-in-time production, for example, economized on prohibitively expensive space. Italian steel producers in Brescia area faced a similar set of disadvantages: high capital costs, high energy costs, and no local raw materials. Located in Northern Lombardy, these privately owned companies faced staggering logistics costs due to their distanced from southern ports and the inefficiencies of the state-owned transportation system. The result: they pioneered technologically advanced minimills that require only modest capital investment, use less energy, employ scrap metal as the feedstock, are efficient at small scale, and permit producers to locate close to sources of scrap and end-use customers. In other words, they converted factor disadvantages into competitive advantage. Disadvantages can become advantages only under certain conditions. First, the must send companies proper signals about circumstances that will spread to other nation thereby equipping them to innovate in advance of foreign rivals. Switzerland, the nation that experienced the first labor shortages after World War II., is a case in point. Swiss companies responded to the disadvantage by upgrading labor productivity and seeking higher value, more sustainable market segments. Companies in most other parts of the world, where there were still ample workers, focused their attention on other issues, which resulted in slower upgrading. The second condition for transforming disadvantages into advantages is favorable circumstances elsewhere in the diamond - consideration that applies to almost all determinants. To innovate, companies must have access to people with appropriate skills and have home-demand condition that sen the right signals. They must also have active domestic rivals who create pressure to innovate. Another precondition is company goals that lead to sustained commitment to the industry. Without such a commitment and the presence of active rivalry, a company may take an easy way around a disadvantage rather than using it as a spur to innovation. For example, U.S. consumer-electronics companies, faced, with high relative labor costs, chose to leave the product and production process largely unchanged and move labor-intensive activities to Taiwan and other Asian countries. Instead of upgrading their sources of advantage, they settled for labor- cost parity. On the other hand, Japanese rivals, confronted with intense domestic competition and a mature home market, chose to eliminate labor through automation. This led to lower assembly costs, to products with fewer components and to improved quality and reliability. Soon Japanese companies were building assembly plants in the United States - the place U.S. companies fled. Demand Conditions It might seem that the globalization of competition would diminish the importance of home demand. In practice however, this is simply not the case. In fact, the composition and character of the home market usually has a disproportionate effect on how companies perceive, interpret, and respond to buyer needs. Nations gain competitive advantage in industries where the home demand gives their companies a clearer or earlier picture of emerging buyer needs, and where demanding buyers pressure companies to innovate faster and achieve more sophisticated competitive advantages than their foreign rivals. The size of home demand proves far less significant than the character of home demand. Home-demand conditions help build competitive advantage when a particular industry segment is larger or more visible in the domestic market than in foreign markets. The larger market segments in a nation receive the most attention from the nation's companies; companies accord smaller or less desirable segment a lower priority. A good example is hydraulic excavators, which represent the most widely used type of construction equipment in the Japanese domestic market - but which comprise a far smaller proportion of the market in other advanced nations. This segment is one of the few where there are vigorous Japanese international competitors and Caterpillar does not hold a substantial share of the world market. More important than the mix of segment per se is the nature of domestic buyers. A nation's companies gain competitive advantage if domestic buyers are the world's most sophisticated and demanding buyers for the product of service. Sophisticated, demanding buyers provide a window int advanced customer needs; they pressure companies to meet high standards; they prod them to improve, to innovate, and to upgrade into more advanced segments. As with factor condition, demand conditions provide advantages by forcing companies to respond to tough challenges. Especially stringent needs arise because of local values and circumstances. For example, Japanese consumers, who live in small, tightly packed homes, must contend with hot, humid summers and high-cost electrical energy - a daunting combination of circumstances. In response, Japanese companies have pioneered compact, quiet air-conditioning units powered by energy-saving rotary compressors. In industry after industry, the tightly constrained requirement of the Japanese market have forced companies to innovate, yielding products the are kei-haku-tan- sho - light, thin, short, small - and that are internationally accepted. Local buyers can help a nation's companies gain advantage if their need anticipate or even shape those of other nations - if their need provide ongoing "early-warning indicators" of global market trends. Sometimes anticipatory needs emerge because a nation's political values foreshadow needs that will grow elsewhere. Sweden's long-standing concern for handicapped people has spawned an increasingly competitive industry focused on special needs. Denmark's environmentalism has led to success for companies in water-pollution control equipment and windmills. More generally, a nation's companies can anticipate global trends if the nation's values are spreading - that is, if the country is exporting its values and tastes as well as its products. The international success of U.S. companies in fast food and credit cards, for example, reflects not only the American desire for convenience but also the spread of these tastes to the rest of the world. Nations export their values and tastes through media, through training foreigners, through political influence, and through the foreign activities of their citizens and companies. Related and Supporting Industries The third broad determinant of national advantage is the presence in the nation of related and supporting industries that are internationally competitive. Internationally competitive home- based suppliers create advantages in downstream industries in several ways. First, they deliver the most cost-effective inputs in an efficient, early, rapid, and sometimes preferential way. Italian gold and silver jewelry companies lead the world in that industry in part because other Italian companies supply two- thirds of the world's jewelry-making and precious-metal recycling machinery. Far more significant than mere access to components and machinery, however, is the advantage that home-based related and supporting industries provide in innovation and upgrading - an advantage based on close working relationship. Suppliers and end-users located near each other can take advantage of short lines of communication, quick and constant flow of information, and an ongoing exchange of ideas and innovations. Companies have the opportunity to influence their suppliers' technical efforts and can serve as test sites for reseach and development work, accelerating the pace of innovation. The illustration of the Italian footwear cluster offers an example of how a group of close-by, supporting industries creates competitive advantage in a range o f interconnected industries that are all internationally competitive. Shoe producers, for instance, interact regularly with leather manufacturers on new styles and manufacturing techniques and learn about new textures and colors of leather when they are still on the drawing boards. Leather manufacturers gain early insights into fashion trends, helping them to plan new products. The interaction is mutually advantageous and self-reinforcing, but does not happen automatically: it is helped by proximity, but occurs only because companies and suppliers work at it. The nation's companies benefit most when the suppliers are, themselves, global competitors. It is ultimately self-defeating for a company or country to create "captive " suppliers who are totally dependent on the domestic industry and prevented from serving foreign competitors. By the same token, a nation need not be competitive in all supplier industries for its companies to gain competitive advantage. Companies can readily source from abroad materials, components, or technologies without a major effect on innovation or performance of the industry's products. The same is true of other generalized technologies - like electronics or software - where the industry represents a narrow application area. Home-based competitiveness in related industries provides similar benefits: information flow and technical interchange speed the rate of innovation and upgrading. A home-based related industry also increases the likelihood that companies will embrace new skills, and it also provides a source of entrants who will bring a novel approach to competing. The Swiss success in pharmaceuticals emerged out of previous international success in the dye industry, for example; Japanese dominance in electronic musical keyboards grows out of success in acoustic instrument combined with a strong position in consumer electronics. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry National circumstances and context create strong tendencies in how companies are created, organized, and managed, as well as what the nature of domestic rivalry will be. In Italy, for example, successful international competitors are often small or medium-sized companies that are privately owned and operated like extended families; in Germany, in contrast, companies tend to be strictly hierarchical in organization and management practices, and top managers usually have technical backgrounds. No one managerial system is universally appropriate - notwithstanding the current fascination with Japanese management. Competitiveness in a specific industry results from convergence of the management practices and organization modes favored in the country and the sources of competitive advantage in the industry. In industries where Italian companies are world leaders - such as lighting, furniture, footwear, woolen fabrics, and packaging machines - a company strategy that emphasizes focus, customized products, niche marketing, rapid change, and breathtaking flexibility fits both the dynamics of the industry and the character of the Italian management system. The German management system, in contrast, works well in technical or engineering-oriented industries - optics, chemicals, complicated machinery - where complex products demand precision manufacturing, a careful development process, after-sale service, and thus a highly disciplined management structure. German success is much rarer in consumer goods and services where image marketing and rapid new-feature and model are important to competition. Countries also differ markedly in the goals that companies and individual seek to achieve. Company goals reflect the characteristics of national capital market and the compensation practices for managers. For example, in Germany and Switzerland, where banks comprise a substantial part of the nation's shareholders, most shares are held for long-term appreciation and are rarely traded. Companies do well in mature industries, where ongoing investment in reseach and development and new facilities is essential but returns may be only moderate. The United States is at the opposite extreme, with a large pool of risk capital but widespread trading of public companies and a strong emphasis by investors on quarterly and annual share-price appreciation. Management compensation is heavily based on annual bonuses tied to individual results. America does well in relatively new industries, like software and biotechnology, or ones where equity funding of new companies feeds active domestic rivalry, like specialty electronics and services. Strong pressures leading to underinvestment, however, plague more mature industries. Individual motivation to work and expand skills is also important to competitive advantage. Outstanding talent is a scarce resource in any nation. A nation's success largely depends on the types of education its talented people choose, where they choose to work, and their commitment and effort. The goals a nation's institutions and values set for individuals and companies, and the prestige it attaches to certain industries, guide the flow of capital and human resources - which, in turn, directly affects the competitive performance of certain industries. Nations tend to be competitive in activities that people admire or depend on - the activities from which the nation's heroes emerge. In Switzerland, it banking and pharmaceuticals. In Israel, the highest callings have been agriculture and defense-related fields. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between cause and effect. Attaining international success can make an industry prestigious, reinforcing its advantage. The presence of strong local rival is a final, and powerful, stimulus to the creation and persistence of competitive advantage. This is true of small countries, like Switzerland, where the rivalry among its pharmaceutical companies, Hoffmann-La Roche, Ciba-Geigy, and Sandoz, contributes to a leading worldwide position. It is true in the United States in the computer and software industries. Nowhere is the role of fierce rivalry more apparent than in Japan, where there are 112 companies competing in machine tools, 34 in semiconductors, 25 in audio equipment, 15 in cameras - in fact, there are usually double figures the industries in which Japan boasts global dominance. (See the table "Estimated Number of Japanese Rivals in Selected Industries" below) Among all the points on the diamond, domestic rivalry is arguably the most important because of the powerfully stimulating effect it has on all the others. Table - ESTIMATED NUMBER OF JAPANESE RIVALS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES Air conditioners 13 Audio equipment 25 Automobiles 9 Cameral 15 Car audio 12 Carbon fibers 7 Construction equipment 15 Copiers 14 Fax machines 10 Large-scale computers 6 Machine tools 112 Personal computers 16 Semiconductors 34 Shipbuilding 33 Television sets 15 Trucks 11 Typewriters 14 VCRs 10 Conventional wisdom argues that domestic competition is wasteful: it leads to duplication of effort and prevents companies form achieving economies of scale. The "right solution" is to embrace one or two national champions, companies with the scale and strength to tackle foreign competitors, and to guarantee them the necessary resources, with the government's blessing. In fact, however, most national champions are uncompetitive, although heavily subsidized and protected by their government. In many of the prominent industries in which there is only one national rival, such as aerospace and telecommunications, government has played a large role in distorting competition. Static efficiency is much less important than dynamic improvement, which domestic rivalry uniquely spurs.. Domestic rivalry, like any rivalry, creates pressure on companies to innovate and improve. Local rivals push each other to lower costs, improve quality and service, and create new products and processes. But unlike rivalries with foreign competitors, which tend to be more analytical and distant, local rivalries often go beyond pure economic or business competition and become intensely personal. Domestic rivals engage in active feuds; they compete not only for market share but also for people, for technical excellence, and perhaps most important, for "bragging rights". One domestic rival's success proves to others that advancement is possible and often attracts new rivals to the industry. Companies often attribute the success of foreign rivals to "unfair advantages". With domestic rivals, there are no excuses. Geographic concentration magnifies the power of domestic rivalry. This pattern is strikingly common around the world: Italian jewelry companies are located around towns, Arezzo and Valenza Po; cutlery companies in Solingen, Germany and Seiki, Japan; pharmaceutical companies in Basel, Switzerland; motorcycles and musical instruments in Hamamatsu, Japan. The more localized the rivalry, the more intense. And the more intense, the better. Another benefit of domestic rivalry is the pressure it creates for constant upgrading of the sources of competitive advantage. The presence of domestic competitors automatically cancels the types of advantage that come from simply being in a particular nation - factor costs, access to or preference in the home market, or costs to foreign competitors who import into the market. Companies are forced to move beyond them, and as a result, gain more sustainable advantages. Moreover, competing domestic rivals will keep each other hones in obtaining government support. Companies are less likely to get hooked on the narcotic of government contracts or creeping industry protectionism. Instead, the industry will seek - and benefit from - more constructive forms of government support, such as assistance in opening foreign markets, as well as investments in focused educational institutions or other specialized factors. Ironically, it is also vigorous domestic competition that ultimately pressures domestic companies to look at global market and toughens them to succeed in them. Particularly when there are economies of scale, local competitors force each other to look outward to foreign markets to capture greater efficiency and higher profitability. And having been tested by fierce domestic competition, the stronger companies are well equipped to win abroad. If Digital Equipment can hold its own against IBM, Data General, Prime, and Hewlett-Packard, going up against Siemens or Machines Bull does not seem so daunting a prospect. ***************************************************************************** Kedves Leirer Laszlo! Koszonet az erdekes alternativ sajto-osszefoglalodrol. (The Nation, Utne Reader, es a tobbiek) Ha tudnal az altalad emlitett tovabbi 10-15 mas kiadvanyrol is izelitot adni, annak azt hiszem nem csak en orulnek. Egy dolog jutott eszembe leveledet olvasva. Mi, akik az otthoni median "nevelkedtunk", azt hiszem oriasi elonyben vagyunk az itteni nagykozonseggel szemben. Otthon ugyanis (szerencse-tlensegu-nkre) nem kellett kulonosebben okosnak, vagy kritikusnak lenni, ahhoz, hogy tudjunk a sorok kozott olvasni - ez egyszeruen alapkovetelmeny volt, mivel a mindenki tudta, hogy a sorokban semmi sem volt igaz, merthogy a sajto is resze volt a "rendszernek". Ez egy egeszseges tavolsagtartast alakitott ki az emberek nagy reszeben a sajtoval szemben. Itt az emberek nagy resze nem all magaval a rendszerrel szemben (hogy ez jo-e vagy nem azt ki-ki maga dontse el; lehet, hogy 5- 10 ev kintlet utan en is maskent latnam ezt, egyelore nem latom, hogy ez alapvetoen olyan rossz rendszer lenne ...), igy pl. nincs egy altalanosan erezheto sajto-ellenesseg sem. A mainstream sajto tenyleg lehetne sokkal-sokkal jobb is. Nehezen tudom megerteni miert van az, hogy mig Angliaban van legalabb 4 kivalo minosegu napilap (Independent, The Times, Guardian, Daily Telegraph - ehhez johet meg a Financial Times is), meg tobb hetilap (most csak az Observer, es a The Economist jut eszembe), addig itt otszor akkora lakossagra jut a New York Times, a Washington Post es a Los Angeles Times, hetilapok kozott egyiket sem tartom osszehasonlithatonak a britekkel (vagy a nemet Der Spiegel-lel, es biztos lehetne a sort mas orszagokkal folytatni). Mindehhez jon meg az ugy nevezett nagy-orszag-effektus. Egy par ismerosom volt hosszabb ideig az USA-ban es a Szu.-ban - es egy hasonlosagot kiemeltek: mennyire nagy a homogenizacio pl. a sajtoban, de altalaban az emberek vilagkepeben is. Ez elesen szembenall egy holland vagy magyar atlagember elettapasztalataval --> kritikai erzek, nyitott szemmel jaras, stb. ((Ez lehet szerintem Europa egyik nagy sansza az amerikai es japan versennyel szemben: a kulturalis, tortenelmi sokszinuseg. Ha ezt tudna valahogy kamatoztatni, akkor sikerulne ujra felzarkozni - ellenkezo esetben - es sajnos erre is sok jel utal - Europa egesze fog a vilaggazdasag peremere szorulni; es nem vigasz hogy meg akkor is lennenek, akiket megelozne...) Voros Peter =============================================== Felado : elekgab@descartes.math.purdue.edu Beerkezett: Fri Mar 8 12:36:42 EST 1991 Temakor : ??? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - =============================================== Felado : ok1kk@gemini.ldc.lu.se Beerkezett: Fri Mar 8 15:33:08 EST 1991 Temakor : Amerika messze van === - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Figyelemremelto pengevaltasnak lehettunk tanui a magyarorszagi helyzet megiteleset illetoen a FORUM hasabjain. Mig otthoni "sarkosan fogalmazo" kollegank mondatai a hazai politikai intezmenyrendszerrel szemben erzett gyulolettol voltak atitatva addig az USA-ban szuletett vitaindito cikk lenyegesen megertobb volt ennek hibaival kapcsolatban. En is ugy talaltam, hogy hosszabb ideje (magyar utlevellel) kint tartozkodo ismeroseim, barataim valamifele felenk optimizmussal ertekelik a hazai helyzetet, mig az otthoni levelekbol csak ugy dol a keseruseg. Ez bizonyos fokig a FORUM-ra is jellemzo. Ennek magyarazata valoszinuleg nem csak abban van, hogy mi nem a borunkon erezzuk az otthoni megprobaltatasokat, hanem,hogy az otthoniak hijan vannak bizonyos informacioknak (a nagy cel) a nyugati demokraciak mukodeset illetoen. Az informaciohiany persze kolcsonos, hiszen a M.O-hoz kozeli Svedo.-ban is igen keveset tudnak az otthoni valtozasokrol. Az azonban bizonyos, hogy a nyugati vilaggal kapcsolatos informaciok hianya jobban sujtja M.O.-t, mint forditva. Talan nem tulzas azt allitani, hogy az informacios tarsadalmak koraban az informaciohiany legalabb akkora hatrany, mint az ipari tarsadalmak koraban az ipari fejlettseg hianya volt. Az informaciohiany egyik vetulete a nyugati politikai-tarsadalmi intezmenyrendszer mukodesi-ellenorzesi rendszerevel kapcsolatos ismeretek hianya. Ez vezet a M.O. szamara szinte mindig negativ eredmennyel jaro osszehasonlitasokhoz a sajtoban, kozeletben sot meg a FORUM hasabjain is. Nem akarok most ennek a hianynak a potlasara vallalkozni csak egy dologra szeretnek celozni. (Habar ha az otthoniak igenylik, olyanokkal egyutt akik jol ismerik allomashelyuk pol.-tars. intezmeny rendszeret szivesen valaszolnek esetleges kerdesekre). A magyar sajtot olvasva az embernek olyan erzese van, hogy letezik egy orszag, amelynek neve NYUGAT. Hegyeshalomnal kezdodik es Tokyoig tart (megfelelo iranyba indulva persze). Az orszag legfobb jellemzoje, hogy PERFEKT, ezenkivul minden az ellentete annak, ami ma M.O. van. Vannak talan akik emlekeznek arra, hogy nem is olyan reg a legfobb jellemzo a jelenlegi 180 fokkal elforgatott transzformaltja volt, pedig NYUGATON A HELYZET VALTOZATLAN talan csak a M.O.-i informaciohiany ugyanaz. Ennek ellenere en allitom, hogy pl. NYUGAT orszag es M.O. politikusai kozott nem az a legfobb kulonbseg, hogy az utobbiak kozott lenyegesen nagyobb szamban lennenek korrupt, hatalommal visszaelo, tehetsegtelen nemzetipopulista-nacik. A korrupcio oka a hatalom. Ha abrazolnank a korrupcio merteket az azonosan korrupt politikusok szamanak fuggvenyeben, feltehetoleg hasonlo GAUSS gorbeket kapnank akar Magyarorszagon akar Svedorszagban , Angliaban (lsd. New Statesman) vagy Ausztriaban vegeznenk a felmerest. Sot allitom, hogy a korai Kadar-korszak (igen-igen 1957-58-ra gondolok) is hasonlo eloszlast adna. Az emberi gyarlosag nem az eletszinvonal vagy kultura fuggvenye. A tarsadalmi kontrollrendszer kialakulasa kb. 200 eves folyamat volt a nyugati vilag orszagaiban. Ez a rendszer igen szovevenyes. Tagjai a sajto, politikai partok, birosagok stb. valamint a 3-4 evenkent az urnakhoz jarulo nep is. A rendszer mukodese hatekony, habar a magyar fogalmak szerint igen lassu. (Gondoljunk csak a Watergate ugyre. Az ugy kirobbanasato az elnok lemondasaig jo hosszu idonek kellett eltelnie). Ennek oka a feed-back szabalyozas. Vagyis a rendszer tagjai egymast is kontrollaljak. Nem eleg ha valakit csak a sajto v. az ellenzeki partok belyegeznek meg. Bizonyos fokig a szavazok iteletet is ki lehet cselezni (ha ez megeri az adott partnak) meg pedig ugy, hogy pl.listan juttatjak be nemelyik fontosnak itelt tagjukat a politikai vezetesbe. Ha azonban konszenzus van a kontrollmech. szereploi kozott a korrupt, hatalmaval visszaelo, (naci stb.) funkcionarusnak mennie kell. A kommunista rendszer utolso kormanyat (Nemeth kormany) sem az kulonboztette meg a jelenlegitol, hogy tobb v. kevesebb szakertoje volt, hanem az hogy senki nem gyakorolt kontrollt felette (egeszen addig a bizonyos marciusi vasarnapig). Ez pedig minosegi kulonbseg. Semmi garancia nem volt arra, hogy valoban az orszag erdekeit tartja szem elott pl. egy-ket ev mulva. Legjobb pl. erre Gorbacsov. Mindenki Gorbija a Nobel dijas demokrata, nehany honap alatt Rettegett Ivanna valtozott. Hiba lenne azt allitani, hogy M.O.-gon a kontroll rendszer kialakulasa ne folyna megnyugtato sebesseggel. Mukodese azonban meg nem erte (nem erhette el) a megfelelo hatekonysagot. A nyugatival osszehasonlitva a mukodese meglehetosen egyenetlen. Bizonyos szereploknek, mint pl. a sajto tul nagy szerep jut, mig masoknak, mint pl. az onkormanyzatok tul keves. Megnyugtato azoban, hogy egy Czinege Lajost v. egy Gaspar Sandort mar ez a rendszer is el tudna tavolitani. A kontoll rendszer kialakitasa ossztarsadalmi ugy, fuggetlen attol, hogy ki van hatalmon. Hatekonysaga v. hianyossagai az egesz tarsadalmat minositik (lsd. pl Romania). Meg nehany gondolatot a Nemeth kormany feldicseresehez (ami egyebkent a honi sajtoban is folyik). A Nemeth kormany nem azert egyezett bele az altalanos valasztasok kiirasaba, mert csupa altruista szakertobol allt. Hanem azert mert hideg fejjel belatta, hogy az altala kituzott feladatokat keptelen megvalositani. pl: >- KULORIENTACIO: > Kokettalas az EK tagsaggal.... > >>>> normalis europai egyuttmukodesbe valo betagolodasra tett lepesek Ezekhez a Nemeth kormany egesz egyszeruen nem volt szalonkepes. >- GAZDASAG: > Monetaris restrikcio, arak felszabaditasa, tamogatasok leepitese, > munkanelkuliseg intezmenyeinek a csirai, adorendszer (hogy a > koltsegvetest torveny szabalyozza), kulgazdasagi reorientacio Ezekhez pedig nem volt erkolcsi tokeje. Gyakran hasonlitjak a Nemeth kormany kulpolitikajat a jelenlegiehez. Bizonyos sajtotermekek azt allitjak, hogy azt nemzetkozi elismerest, amit a Nemeth kormany szerzett Magyarorszagnak a jelenlegi vezetes a Jugoszlav fegyverszallitassal tonkre tette (mar csak egy ujabb Nemeth kormany allithatna vissza). Hm. Vajon mi artott jobban az orszag tekintelyenek az 1989 februari VSZ egyesitett fegyveres erok gyakorlat (a Nemeth kormany aranykoraban) vagy 10000 db Kalasnyikov a Horvatoknak ? Vajon mennyi fegyvert es hova kellett szallitani ahhoz, hogy az USA maig is ervenyes COCOM listara vegye M.O.-t. Vagy, hogy a mai napig meg van tiltva magyaroknak bizonyos szuperszamitogepek (pl. Cray) hasznalata kulfoldon ? Hangsulyozom megegyszer en tudom milyen hihetetlen nehez terhet visel a magyar tarsadalom es hogy milyen heroikus erofeszitessel probal (egyelore meg) felzarkozni a nyugathoz. De ugy gondolom, hogy az eddig elert eredmenyek tukreben semmi alapja sincs a fatalista onmarcangolasnak. Szabo Kalman (Svedorszag) =============================================== Felado : hetyei@athena.mit.edu Beerkezett: Fri Mar 8 22:19:45 EST 1991 Temakor : Re: Amerika messze van - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kedves Lajos, eloszor is megnyugtatasul: soha senki Forum-hozzaszolasan nem sertodtem meg meg, es nem is fogok. Ugyanezt bizalommal felteteleztem/feltetelezem Rolad is. A preview.FORUM-bol latom, hogy masok nalam sokkal kompetensebb modon felveszik a kesztyut, ugyhogy en csak nehany logikai ugrasra szeretnem felhivni a figyel- medet, amelyet a buta matematikus fejemmel nem birtam kovetni, illetve nehany apro kiegeszitest tennek. >A naci gondolatot nem latom koherens, kifejlett szellemtorteneti >iranynak. Ezutan valamivel lejjebb: >Az emlitett nemzeti populizmus legkozelebbi SZELLEMI rokona >(szo sincs halalgyarakrol) ketsegkivul a nacizmus. Namarmost, ha a nacizmus nem szellemi, akkor hogyan vannak szellemi rokonai? :-) Csak zarojelben: az en reakciom, egy olyan megjegyzesedre szolt, ahol egy- szeruen naciztal, mindenfele szellemi es egyeb jelzok nelkul. Meglehet, kicsit tul patetikusan tiltakoztam a fogalom-osszemosasod ellen. Igy magamat is kie- geszitendo, hozzateszem: a "naci" fogalom tul tag hasznalata szerintem, azaltal hogy egyszintre helyezi a nacizmust mas, kevesbe elitelendo felfogasokkal, egyben a nacizmust is "szalonkepesebbe teszi", ami semmikepp sem kivanatos. Kis nepekrol: itt mintha egymas mellett beszelnenk. Szoval sem mondtam azt, hogy a baltiak nem nyomjak el a kisebbsegeiket- ezen a teren Neked szemmellat- hatoan tobb az informaciod. Azt hangsulyoztam, hogy minden nepnek-etnikumnak joga van az onrendelkezeshez, akar rendes, akar gonosz, akar szep, akar csunya neprol van szo. Emellett mintha elmentel volna, tovabb hajtogatva, hogy el- nyomjak az esztek a kisebbsegeiket. Adataidat nem vitatom, kiveve a kisebbsegek legnagyobbreszt "eloroszosodott lengyel" voltat. Tudomasom szerint, a kisebb- segek zome betelepitett orosz, es az Altalad emlitett szavazojoghoz szukseges 10 (vagy tobb) eves ottlakassal szembeni ellenerzes mutatja, hogy joreszuknek meg ez a feltetel is husbavag. Nekem is belekerulne 10 evembe egy francia vagy amerikai allampolgarsag megszerzese, pedig en meg beszelek is angolul meg franciaul. Es raadasul az en nyelvemet nem eroltette evtizedeken at a vilag legnagyobb hadserege a bennszulottekre. Ettol eltekintve a bozgorozast en is utalom, igy maximalisan egyetertek Veled, hogy meg a Voros Hadsereg ott allomasozo tisztjeinek is meg kell adni a letele- pedesi jogot. (Ezt igy Te nem mondtad, de en meg ezt is hozzateszem.) A Use- net-en egyebkent ugy olvastam, hogy pl. meg a litvaniai oroszok 60%-a is a litvan fuggetlenseget tamogatja. Egy interjut is talaltam egy orosz holggyel, aki elmagyarazta, nincsenek illuzioik a litvanokkal kapcsolatban, de ezt a kerdest akkor akarjak majd rendezni, ha mar megvan a szabadsag. (Ertsd: Moszk- vatol valo fuggetlenseg.Ez talan adalek a fuggetlenseg=Kanaan? kerdeshez is, megha egy orosz kisebbsegi szajabol jott is a megjegyzes, akinek helyzetenel fogva kevesebb az illuzioja.) (Januarban kozzetettem a Forumon egy nemzetisegi statisztikat a balti orszagok- rol, ha valakinek meg megvan, nagy szivesseget tenne a visszaidezese- vel.) Nagy erdeklodessel olvastam felvillantott otthoni kepeidet. Ezek lattan, lega- labbis lelektanilag jobban ertem multkori hozzaszolasodat. A parducbor kaca- ganyos szinpadi magyarkodast sose szerettem, es az ilyen pojacaskodas legalabb annyira serti hazafias erzeseimet, mint a hazaszeretet es a nacizmus osszemo- sasa. Kar, hogy manapsag leginkabb csak ez a valasztek a politikai szinpadon. Peldaid kozul csak egy volt, melynek ertekeleseben nem egeszen ertek egyet: augusztus 20 protokollaris allami unneppe nyilvanitasarol van szo. Akar 1848-at, akar 1956-ot nezem, mindketto elvetelt forradalmi kiserlet volt, melyek ertekeleseben raadasul soha nem volt teljes nemzeti egyetertes. Miert legyen egy olyan unnep az egesz nemzete, melyet: 1. Nem mindenki erez egyforman magaenak 2. Tragikus kimenetelu tortenelmi esemenyre utal, tovabb novelve az amugy is tulburjanzott "balsors akit regen tep"-komplexust. Ha meg mar a diplomaciai megfontolasok mellet tartunk, lehet, hogy aug 20 "a diplomaciai naptar szerint legkedvezotlenebb", viszont nem okoz olyan dip- lomaciai bonyodalmakat, mint okt 23 okozna a szovjet-magyar vagy marc 15 okozna a magyar-roman viszonyban.(Nem vagyok benne biztos, mekkora sullyal kell diplo- maciai szempontokat merlegelni a hivatalos allami unnep kivalasztasakor, de ha mar felmerult ez az aspektus, erdemes az osszes ervet nezni.) S vegul a legfontosabb: aug. 20 elsosorban nem egyhazi unnep, hanem a magyar allamisag unnepe. E napon jott letre az elso europai jellegu, vagy legalabbis Europaba tartozni akaro magyar allam. Szent Istvan orokseget- a valodit- valoban lehet es erdemes vallalnunk. Bizonyos mertekig ezt -aug 20 alkotmany- ill. uj-kenyer-unnepkent valo megtartasaval -meg az ilyen erzekenysegekre keveset ado Magyar Nepkoztarsasag is megtette. Vagyis: ne ontsuk ki a furdovizzel egyutt a gyereket is. Maradok tisztelettel, Hetyei Gabor =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= =* TIPP FORUM MAHAL HUNET hozzaszolasok bekuldese az XMAIL-re *= =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= =* To: contacts@phoenix.princeton.edu *= =* Subject: XMAIL {mast ne irj a Subject mezobe} *= =* *= =* UJSAGNEV temakor {az UJSAGNEV lehet TIPP FORUM MAHAL HUNET,} *= =* ... {de csak egy ezek kozul} *= =* ... {utana kovetkezhet a hozzaszolasod} *= =* ... {egeszen a leveled vegeig} *= =* *= =* A temakor tobb szobol is allhat, de csak a kovetkezo karaktereket *= =* hasznald: a..z A..Z 0..9 !@%-_=+.: (a tobbit a gep kicsereli "="-re). *= =* Figyelem!!! Az ujsag nevet CSUPA NAGYBETUVEL kell beirni! *= =* Lapzarta: mindennap 22:48pm EST *= =* *= =* A fentitol eltero formaju levelek nem jelennek meg, es nyomuk sem *= =* marad. Kulonosen nagy sebesseggel vesznek el a Reply-lyal kuldott *= =* levelek :-(. Ha ennel reszletesebb informaciora van szukseged, az *= =* UJSAGNEV helyett ird azt hogy HELP, temakornek pedig azt hogy "all". *= =* A contacts-on a mail-t SENKI sem olvassa!!! Ha nekem akarsz irni, *= =* hasznald a kovetkezo cimek egyiket: *= =* >>> hollosi@helios.ucsc.edu <<<--->>> hollosi@portal.bitnet <<< *= =* *= =* Hollosi Jozsi. *= =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=