RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 3, No. 37, 23 February 1999

SLOVAK AGENTS WHO SOUGHT TO DISCREDIT NEIGHBORS
DISMISSED... Slovak Counter-Intelligence Service (SIS)
agents who were involved in provocation aimed at
preventing the accession to NATO of the Czech Republic
and Hungary have been dismissed, the new head of the SIS
told CTK on 22 February. Vladimir Mitro added that he
"has no information" confirming that such operations had
been conducted at the request of foreign secret
services, such as Russia's. In a report delivered to the
parliament's closed session on 12 February, Mitro said
that under his predecessor, Ivan Lexa, the SIS had
"active contacts" with the Russian secret services. MS

...AS HUNGARY OPENS SIS ACTIVITY INVESTIGATION. The
Hungarian Intelligence Office and the National Security
Office have launched an investigation to identify SIS
contacts in Hungary during the term in office of
Vladimir Meciar's government, Hungarian media reported
on 22 February. Intelligence sources said that agents
working in Slovakia passed on to Budapest information
about contacts between the SIS and criminal gangs
operating in Hungary. In his report, Mitro also said the
SIS's "Operation Omega" was aimed at creating the
impression among Hungary's neighbors that Budapest was
being treated preferentially by the U.S. MSZ/MS

HUNGARY NOT TO JOIN POSSIBLE NATO ACTIONS IN KOSOVA.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Gabor Horvath on 22 February
said Hungary will not "actively take part "in any NATO
operation in Yugoslavia. If peace talks in France are
successful, Hungary could provide health and technical
aid units, but only outside Yugoslavia, he said. "A
parliamentary resolution that allows NATO to use
Hungary's air space is still in force, but this does not
include the use of the Taszar military air base,"
Horvath noted. MSZ



END NOTE

BREAKTHROUGH IN UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN RELATIONS?

by Michael Shafir

	The recent visit to Romania by Ukrainian Foreign
Minister Borys Tarasyuk left observers with more
questions than answers. The visit--the first to be paid
to Bucharest by a chief Ukrainian diplomat in seven
years--was primarily intended to clarify the status of
negotiations on issues unresolved in the June 1997
bilateral treaty. On signing that document, the two
sides agreed to try to reach an agreement on those
issues within two years; failing that, they would ask
the International Court of Justice in The Hague to make
a ruling.
	Negotiations at expert level, however, seemed to
have stalled, despite repeated reassurances of
"progress." The issues put on hold for two years include
the status of Serpents' Island in the Black Sea, which
was handed over to the former Soviet Union by Romania in
1948 and which became part of Ukraine when the Soviet
empire collapsed; the delimitation of the continental
shelf in the Black Sea, which is believed to be rich in
oil reserves; and the demarcation of the border, which
is currently runs along the Romanian bank of the Chilia
branch of the River Danube delta and which Bucharest
wants moved to the middle of the branch. But there are
also issues on which the two neighbors disagree--above
all, the implementation of the treaty's provisions
dealing with the rights of national minorities.
	Whether any progress was made during Tarasyuk's
visit is still unclear. Optimists would point to the
joint press conference held by Tarasyuk and his Romanian
counterpart, Andrei Plesu: a "significant breakthrough"
was announced, but the nature of that breakthrough
remains unclear. The two sides were said to have reached
agreement to continue negotiations on "delicate and
sensitive issues" and to settle them "amicably," without
appealing to the court in The Hague.
	Judging from hints dropped by Tarasyuk, the
Romanians appear to have agreed to renounce any claim on
Serpents' Island, with the Ukrainian foreign minister
arguing that Ukraine's "rightful ownership" of the
island "is beyond any question."
	Did the two sides reach a "package" agreement
whereby Ukraine would agree to the earlier proposal by
Romanian President Emil Constantinescu that the sides
jointly exploit the natural resources in the continental
shelf? From Kyiv's perspective, this would involve a
major concession, but Radu Vasile's cabinet might find
it difficult to secure approval of such a deal.
	It is no secret that Bucharest's rather surprising
willingness to sign the 1997 bilateral treaty--which
among other things, foresees the renunciation of
historical territorial claims on Ukraine (northern
Bukovina and the Herta territory annexed by the Soviet
Union in 1940)--was motivated by one major factor: the
hope of securing an invitation at the NATO summit in
summer 1997 to join the alliance. With those hopes
dashed and with little chance of receiving such an
invitation at the upcoming summit in Washington, many in
Romania are likely to question any "further
concessions." And opposition is likely to come not only
from the ranks of the ruling coalition's political
rivals (who have successfully stirred up nationalist
sentiment against the treaty) but also from within the
ranks of the coalition itself.
	Why would Bucharest propose such a compromise
solution? Because it apparently has no choice. Ukraine,
which is both a nuclear power and, despite its continued
economic difficulties, a potentially strong economic
partner of the West--is much more likely to succeed in
enlisting Western support for its goals than is
Bucharest.
	But there are two more reasons. First, with
presidential elections due in Ukraine later this year,
Romanians must be aware that unless they hurry up, they
may have to conduct negotiations with a more
nationalist-inclined and perhaps even a "nostalgic
Communist" in the driver's seat in Kyiv--a somewhat less
than thrilling prospect for Bucharest. Second, Kyiv has
already taken some steps that are seen in the Romanian
capital as aimed at increasing Ukrainian territorial
claims, despite Tarasyuk's denials that this is the
case. Kyiv has declared the area around Serpent's Island
as a nature reserve, which under international law would
give Ukraine the right--at least in theory--to enlarge
its territorial waters from 12 to 200 nautical miles
from the coastline.
	Second, there is the issue of minority rights. In
1997, the Romanian side insisted on including the
Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201 in the treaty
with Ukraine, after long opposing its inclusion in the
treaty with Hungary. Now, Bucharest is now demanding
that a "multicultural" university be set up in
Cernivtsi/Cernauti, while largely stalling on measures
to set up such a university for its own Hungarian
minority. Many media outlets have long engaged in a
campaign aimed at stirring up anti-Ukrainian sentiment,
claiming that Ukraine does not respect its obligations
toward the 135,000- strong Romanian speaking minority.
Those conducting such a campaign disregard the fact that
some of these "Romanians" consider themselves Moldovans
and reject close contacts with Bucharest.
	Tarasyuk, while not denying that problems do exist,
says that a lack of funds, rather than ill-will, is to
blame. He was quick to point out during his visit that
there is only one Ukrainian high school in Romania and
that instruction there is conducted 75 percent in the
Romanian language. In order to seek a solution, the two
sides agreed that a commission of experts will study the
issue. As conventional wisdom has it: where there is
good will, issues are solved; where there is none,
commissions are set up.

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